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QUESTION PRESENTED
The Medicaid expansion in Section 2001(a)(1)(C)
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is
one part of Congress’s comprehensive effort to expand
access to health care coverage. This expansion is not
revolutionary, but builds on many prior statutory
amendments to Medicaid. Nor does it alter the voluntary nature of the Medicaid program – as before,
States remain free to decline federal funding. The
Petitioners and their amici have mischaracterized the
expansion to obscure these facts, hoping this Court
will unravel this hard-fought legislative enactment.
The question presented is whether Congress may
offer States generous additional funding for Medicaid,
with spending conditions that entirely satisfy the
four-part test in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203
(1987).
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1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Health Law & Policy Scholars are scholars who
study and teach health law and policy in the United
States. We seek to correct the factual record on the
history and expansion of the Medicaid program, and
thus to place this litigation in its proper context. The
Medicaid expansion in the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act is not revolutionary by any
standard but is a step-wise extension, built on programs from various State laboratories of democracy
over the years. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285
U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Prescription Policy Choices is a nonprofit educational and public policy organization providing objective research and expertise on prescription drug
policy.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

STATEMENT
Medicaid is a cooperative federal-state program.
States choosing to participate must submit a State
plan for approval by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services. While Medicaid gives States some
1

This brief is submitted with the consent of the parties, as
lodged with the Clerk per the Docket Sheets. Pursuant to Rule
37.6, counsel represent that this brief was not authored in whole
or in part by counsel for any party. Amici have borne their own
expenses, without support from any party. The Boston University School of Law provided pro bono assistance.

2
discretion in designing and administering their programs, since 1965 federal law has imposed numerous
mandatory requirements, including categories of individuals and families who must be covered, services
that States must provide, and requirements for administering the program. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 301 (1980) (“Although participation in the Medicaid program is entirely optional, once a State elects
to participate, it must comply with the requirements
of [the Medicaid Act].”); 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(10).
Congress enacted Section 2001(a)(1)(C) of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (ACA or Act),2 to expand
the Medicaid program, creating a new mandatory
category of eligibility that States must cover beginning January 1, 2014. ACA §2001(a)(1)(C). This
category includes children and adults under 65 with
incomes up to 133% of the federal poverty level (FPL)
who are not pregnant, eligible for Medicare, or otherwise eligible through another mandatory Medicaid
category. Id. Petitioners’ constitutional challenge
focuses on this particular provision. States’ Br. 7-8.
Petitioners do not challenge any optional Medicaid
features of the ACA, see, e.g., ACA §2001(a)(4) (giving
states an option to cover those with incomes up to
133% FPL prior to 2014); ACA §2401 (community first
option to cover attendant-care services for those at

2

Amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029.

3
risk of institutionalization). Neither do they challenge
new mandatory administrative requirements for reporting adult quality of care for Medicaid enrollees,
ACA §2701; major modifications to Medicaid drug
coverage, ACA §§2501-2503; or increased primary
care payment rates in Medicaid, ACA §1202 (as
amended).
Petitioners claim that ACA §2001(a)(1)(C) is an
“extreme and unprecedented abuse,” changing the
fundamental nature of Medicaid. States’ Br. 23. But
imposing new Medicaid mandatory provisions on
States as part of a national health policy agenda is
not unusual. Medicaid was enacted in 1965 as part of
a suite of Social Security Act amendments that also
created Medicare to provide health insurance for
elderly retired workers. Since the beginning, Medicaid has been part of larger Congressional health
policy programs. Also since the beginning, Medicaid
has imposed mandatory eligibility, services, and administrative requirements on participating States.
The ACA’s inclusion of a new category of mandatory
eligibility is not surprising and is in keeping with
well-settled expectations.
Petitioners claim that the Act somehow radically
departs from the first forty-seven years of Medicaid.
States’ Br. 7-8, 10-11, 23. It is nothing new, however,
for Congress to enact mandatory Medicaid reforms as
part of a comprehensive package addressing national
health policy problems.

4
Petitioners give the impression that Congress
has never expanded Medicaid with broader program
conditions attached to State participation. States’ Br.
5-6, 22. But on numerous occasions, Congress has
required conditions for continued participation in the
already-existing program. Congress has included
mandatory Medicaid reforms – some related to eligibility, others to benefits and coverage, and still others
related to payment and administration – in the mix of
broader policy interventions designed to tackle problems that transcend any single solution in a pluralistic and multi-state health care system. See Kaiser
Family Foundation, Medicaid: A Timeline of Key Developments, 1965 – 2009. Indeed, conditional Medicaid
expansions to address national problems have been a
hallmark of the program since its enactment. Sidney
D. Watson, The View from the Bottom: ConsumerDirected Medicaid and Cost-Shifting to Patients, 51
St. Louis L.J. 403, 405 (2007); Sara Rosenbaum,
Medicaid, 346 New Eng. J. Med. 635, 635 (2002). The
following examples illustrate this important facet of
Medicaid program history, undermining key assumptions in Petitioners’ arguments about the supposedly
unique constitutional injury inflicted by the Act.
A. Congress Has Previously Added New Mandatory Eligibility Categories to Medicaid
Petitioners are correct that in 1965, when Medicaid was first enacted, mandatory eligibility was
typically tied to eligibility for federal-state cooperative welfare programs. States’ Br. 2-3. However,

5
beginning in 1972, Congress amended Medicaid,
adding mandatory federal eligibility requirements,
often as one part of broader, national health policy
goals. The ACA’s new mandatory category for lowincome children and adults, ACA §2001(a)(1)(C), is
simply the latest example in this long-standing
tradition of using Medicaid mandatory categories as
an instrument of national health policy to guarantee
the poorest American access to affordable health
insurance. Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty:
Revisiting Structure and Meaning in a Post-Deficit
Reduction Act Era, 9 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 5, 1622 (2006).
In 1972, Congress ended the federal-state cooperative welfare program for the aged, blind and disabled and replaced it with Supplemental Security
Income (SSI). Social Security Act Amendments of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329, §§201, 301.
Congress revised Medicaid to reflect this new national policy and required States to either extend
Medicaid to all those eligible for the new SSI program
or, under the so-called 209(b) option, allow those with
incomes above the State’s old cooperative welfare
program eligibility limits to qualify for Medicaid by
deducting medical expenses from income. Id. §§209,
301, as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-66, 87 Stat. 152,
§212 (1973); Gov’t Br. 6.
Petitioners make much of the fact that the 1972
amendments allowed States two options to comply
with the new national policy. States’ Br. 4. Both
options, however, were expansions. States did not
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have the option to forgo expansion entirely. Gov’t Br.
5-6.
In 1988, Congress went even further, completely
de-linking Medicaid eligibility for children and pregnant women from federal-state cooperative welfare
programs. Congress created new mandatory eligibility categories up to 133% FPL for children from birth
to age 5 and pregnant women, and up to 100% FPL
for children age 6-18. See Medicare Catastrophic
Coverage Act of 1988 (MCCA), §302, Pub. L. No. 100360, 102 Stat. 683 (adding 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(A)(10)(i),
1396a(l)); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990,
§4601, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388. States
were required to cover everyone in these new mandatory categories. Congress did not offer States any
choice, other than leaving Medicaid entirely.
B. Congress Has Previously Expanded Mandatory Medicaid Benefit Categories as Part
of Broader National Child Health Policies
In 1967, Congress reacted to two national crises:
rampant poor health among preschool children and
the high rate at which young draftees were failing
Army physical exams. Sara Rosenbaum et al., National Security and U.S. Child Health Policy: The
Origins and Continuing Role of Medicaid and EPSDT
6-11 (2005). In response, Congress enacted a suite of
reforms aimed at strengthening the education and
training of pediatric health professionals and provided direct financing to public health departments to
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identify, screen, and treat impoverished children and
youth. Social Security Act Amendments of 1967, Title
III, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821.
As part of this larger initiative, Congress dramatically expanded mandatory federal Medicaid coverage requirements, creating the Early and Periodic
Screening Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) Program. EPSDT required States to cover, at minimum:
a comprehensive health and developmental history; a
comprehensive unclothed physical exam; appropriate
immunizations; laboratory tests; health education;
vision, dental, and hearing services; and care needed
to diagnose or treat an identified condition, even if
that treatment is not otherwise available under a
State’s Medicaid plan. See 42 U.S.C. 1396d(r). EPSDT
expanded the mandatory coverage standards for
children to a level unequaled in public or private
health insurance at the time. Sara Rosenbaum &
Paul S. Wise, Crossing the Medicaid-Private Insurance Divide: The Case of EPSDT, 26 Health Affairs
382, 383-384 (2007).
Since 1967, Congress has strengthened EPSDT
several times, often over political objections from
some States. See Alice Sardell & Kay Johnson, The
Politics of EPSDT Policy in the 1990s: Policy Entrepreneurs, Political Streams, and Children’s Health
Benefits, 76 Milbank Q. 175, 186, 190-192, 197-198
(1998); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989,
§6403, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106 (further
delineating the scope of EPSDT benefit, including
an express mandate that States cover “Such other
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necessary health care, diagnostic services, treatment,
and other measures . . . to correct or ameliorate
defects and physical and mental illnesses and conditions discovered by the screening services, whether or
not such services are covered under the State plan”);
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, §6044, Pub. L. No. 109171, 120 Stat. 4 (requires States to preserve EPSDT
coverage in benchmark packages); Children’s Health
Insurance Program (CHIP) Reauthorization Act of
2009, §611, Pub. L. No. 111-3, 123 Stat. 8 (clarifying
requirement to provide EPSDT in benchmark packages); ACA, §2201 (preserving EPSDT as part of the
newly reconfigured benchmarks).
C. Congress Has Previously Imposed Mandatory Medicaid Reimbursement Rules as
Part of Larger Efforts to Develop and Sustain a Health Care Safety Net for Medically
Underserved Communities
Nearly one-third of America’s population resides
in medically underserved urban and rural communities. Sara Rosenbaum et al., National Health Reform:
How Will Medically Underserved Communities Fare?,
Policy Research Brief No. 10, 3 (2009). The needs
of these communities are acute. Their inhabitants
tend to be sicker, poorer, and older than the general
population, are more likely to either be uninsured or to
have public insurance, and have diminished access to
health care providers. See Sidney D. Watson, Mending the Fabric of Small Town America: Health Reform
and Rural Economies, 113 W. Va. L. Rev. 1, 5 (2010);
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Kevin Grumbach et al., Physician Supply and Access
to Care in Urban Areas, 16 Health Affairs 71, 78-79
(1997). Although some States invested in public
hospitals and local health department services, a
national, systematic approach was needed to support
a health care safety net. See, e.g., Health Resources
and Services Administration, Designation of Medically Underserved Populations and Health Professions
Shortage Areas, 73 Fed. Reg. 11232-11281 (Feb. 29,
2008).
In response, Congress established the National
Health Service Corps in 1972 and added the Community Health Centers program three years later as
basic components of Public Health Service Act programs to support services to underserved communities. Sara Rosenbaum et al., Community Health
Centers in an Era of Health System Reform and
Economic Downturn: Prospects and Challenges 1-2
(2009).
As part of national policies to support these
communities and the safety net providers who serve
them, Congress added mandatory reimbursement and
administrative requirements to Medicaid. In 1981,
Congress required States to provide enhanced reimbursement to hospitals that treat a disproportionate
number of uninsured and Medicaid patients. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, §2173, Pub. L.
No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357; see also Theresa A. Coughlin
& David Liska, The Medicaid Disproportionate Share
Hospital Payment Program: Background and Issues
1-2 (1997). In 1989, Congress required States to pay
clinics designated as either rural health clinics or
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federally qualified health centers at a special, typically higher, rate. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1989, §6404, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106.
These mandatory Medicaid reimbursement rules
are yet another example of how Congress has used
Medicaid to implement national health policies.
While States retain discretion to design the outer
limits of their Medicaid programs, Congress repeatedly has used mandatory Medicaid requirements to
define the “very core.” Gov’t Br. 24, 26.
D. Congress Has Previously Imposed New Mandatory Quality Standards for Long-Term
Care in Medicaid as Part of Broader Safety
and Quality Efforts
The quality of nursing home care became a national concern in the mid-1980s, following numerous
investigations of substandard care and patient safety
problems. Institute of Medicine, Improving the Quality of Care in Nursing Homes 3-4 (1986). Because the
financial base of the nursing home industry rests substantially on Medicare and Medicaid, Congress used
these programs to reshape nursing home quality.
In 1987, Congress enacted a detailed set of requirements addressing quality, resident safety, and residents’ rights as conditions for Medicare and Medicaid
certification. These conditions of participation required nursing homes to provide regular assessments
of residents’ functional capacities and written care
plans based on these assessments; offer enumerated
activities and services to residents; maintain staffing
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levels by qualified personnel for specified hours; give
residents transfer and discharge rights; and protect
residents’ funds. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, §4211, 101 Stat. 1330.
In conjunction with these amendments, Congress
required States to establish nurse aide competency
evaluations, registries, and nursing facility administrator standards; evaluate each mentally ill or developmentally disabled resident annually to determine
if they should be discharged; amend State plans to
account for new federal requirements; and, most notably, conduct annual, unannounced, standardized
surveys of long-term care facilities, with follow-up
investigation of allegations of resident abuse and
neglect. Id. at §§4201, 4202.
Once again, Medicaid mandatory requirements –
this time mandatory requirements as to how States
administer their programs – were added in the service of larger national health policy concerns.
E. Congress Has Previously Imposed New Mandatory Medicaid Requirements on States as
Part of Medicare Part D Prescription Drug
Coverage
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement,
and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173,
117 Stat. 2066 (MMA), represents another example of
a national health policy problem that includes Medicaid as part of the solution. Jonathan Oberlander,
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Through the Looking Glass: The Politics of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act, 32 J. of Health Pol., Pol’y & L. 187, 190-191
(2007). Republican leadership in Congress supported
the MMA, but it was narrowly enacted with scant
support from Democrats. Id.
The MMA was a response to the urgent need to
extend affordable prescription drug coverage to the
nation’s Medicare beneficiaries, including 8.9 million
individuals covered by both Medicare and Medicaid
(dual eligibles). Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and
the Uninsured, Dual Eligibles: Medicaid’s Role for
Low-Income Medicare Beneficiaries 1 (2011). The
Republican-led extension of the Medicare outpatient
prescription drug benefit (Part D) to dual eligibles
was entirely compulsory, not optional, for States.
Part D displaced each state’s Medicaid prescription drug coverage program for dual eligibles. MMA
§103. The legislation eliminated state options concerning Medicaid coverage of outpatient prescription
drugs and established a single national program
under direct federal control. Financing included compulsory State contributions (known as the “clawback”) toward the cost of Part D. MMA §103. The
expenditures were not nominal: the Congressional
Budget Office estimated that States would pay a total
of $155 billion in clawback payments to the federal
government between 2007 and 2016. Cong. Budget
Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal
Years 2007 to 2016, at 59 (2006). In 2003, States
protested the clawback, characterizing it as “an
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unprecedented intrusion into each State’s sovereignty.” Texas v. Leavitt, 547 U.S. 1204 (2006) (mem.)
(denying original jurisdiction to States seeking an
injunction against implementation of the Part D
clawback); Brief of Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae
In Support of Pls., Texas, 547 U.S. 1204 (No. 135).
Nevertheless, States have now successfully adapted
their Medicaid programs to Part D’s requirements.
F. Conclusion
The history of the Medicaid program is long and
detailed. Our purpose in this Statement is to highlight several significant mandatory expansions since
1965 that Congress has enacted as part of larger
national health policies. Petitioners characterize the
ACA’s mandatory eligibility expansion as an “extreme
and unprecedented abuse,” States’ Br. 23, 39-42, because it works in tandem with other health legislation to accomplish the national health policy goal of
making health insurance affordable for all Americans.
If the mandatory expansion in ACA §2001(a)(1)(C) is
indeed coercive – as Petitioners claim – then they
must articulate why no previous Medicaid expansions
have been coercive. In fact, Petitioners overstate the
discontinuity in the Act. As history makes clear, these
changes build on prior foundations and are by no
means unprecedented.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The ACA’s provisions expanding Medicaid eligibility are entirely consistent with the recognized
scope of congressional spending power and the longstanding cooperative nature of the Medicaid program.
Acknowledging that the ACA’s Medicaid provisions
clearly satisfy the four-part test in South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-208 (1987), Petitioners now
ask this Court to “fashion” new limits on the spending
power. States’ Br. 28, Gov’t Br. 15-16. But the ACA
amendments to Medicaid do not warrant a departure
from established precedent and practice.
To merit novel judicial treatment of the Medicaid
amendments, Petitioners must demonstrate that
whatever they claim is wrong with Medicaid is entirely new and novel. As a baseline, the States’ challenge
cannot be understood to assert constitutional infirmity to tried and true features of the existing program.
If there is a straw that breaks the camel’s back, it
must be constitutionally distinguishable from all
previous straws in Medicaid. Petitioners fail in this
task.
The federal government has for many decades
used Medicaid as a tool to further larger, national
health policy goals. The fundamental elements of
Medicaid have long been mandatory. While unconditional block grants to States might be a political
objective for some Petitioners, it would be a late
moment in the history of the Republic to discover that
the Constitution requires it.
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Petitioners stake their entire coercion case on a
single claim: that the federal government is making
an offer the States cannot refuse, holding the existing
Medicaid program hostage unless the States agree to
mandatory Medicaid expansions. States’ Br. 8-9, 3942. But Petitioners do not – and cannot – point to any
textual support in the ACA for their contention: each
proffered text is either indistinguishable from many
prior Medicaid amendments, relies on a distinction
that entails no constitutional significance, or is
simply misinterpreted. Furthermore, while the States
claim the threatened loss of all Medicaid funding,
States’ Br. 10-11, 39-40, this result is anything but a
foregone conclusion. Rather, any denial of federal
funding rests in the reasonable discretion of the
Secretary, who has never withdrawn all Medicaid
funding for State noncompliance.
Nor should the number of Petitioners now opposed to the ACA impress this Court. Political differences over health reform policy do not equate to
unconstitutional coercion of States by Congress. Or as
fourth circuit judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III puts it,
“[o]ur [judicial] self-control will be put to the test. The
health care reform act of 2010 seems misconceived in
many ways, but flawed legislation is not on that
account unconstitutional.” J. Harvie Wilkinson III,
Cosmic Constitutional Theory: Why Americans Are
Losing Their Inalienable Right to Self-Governance (in
press, 2012).
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

16
ARGUMENT
I.

Congress Has Exercised Its Spending
Power in a Clearly Constitutional Manner
A. The Medicaid Amendments Satisfy Existing Precedent

The Court’s Spending Clause jurisprudence clearly
authorizes Congress to expand Medicaid to cover
low-income children and adults, and this case does
not compel reconsideration of well-established precedent. Bedrock cases defining the federal spending
power allow Congress to offer financial incentives to
States willing to participate in federal programs and
policies. States are free to refuse federal conditional
funding and exercise their fiscal and administrative
autonomy through their own ability to tax and spend.
Petitioners are unable to cite any Supreme Court
precedent supporting their arguments that the Act’s
Medicaid amendments violate this Court’s previously
recognized limits on the spending power or unconstitutionally coerce States, as evidenced by their request
that the Court “fashion” limits. States’ Br. 28; U.S.
CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
Precedent undergirding the Medicaid program’s
essential design is long-standing, unambiguous, and
undisturbed. Since 1936, the Court has endorsed the
general welfare clause as a separate enumerated
power and has recognized Congress’s authority to
place conditions on both taxing and spending to influence state policy. See United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1, 66 (1936); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301
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U.S. 548, 591 (1937); see also Helvering v. Davis, 301
U.S. 619, 644-645 (1937). Congress relied on these
precedents when amending the Social Security Act in
1965 to create Medicaid.
Two recent cases have explored limits on federal
conditional spending power, and neither compels a
different result for the Medicaid issue before the
Court. First, in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203
(1987), the Court relied on the established reasoning
in Helvering, Steward Machine, and Butler to set
forth a four-part test for conditional spending, id. at
207-208. In the present case, the court of appeals
noted that “[t]he state plaintiffs do not contend that
the Act’s Medicaid expansion violates any of these
restrictions” under Dole. Florida v. HHS, 648 F.3d
1235, 1263 (11th Cir. 2011); Gov’t Br. 15-16.
Dole also rejected South Dakota’s push for a
Tenth Amendment limitation on conditional spending, tracking the reasoning advanced by the federal
government. See Brief for the United States, Dole,
483 U.S. 203 (No. 86-260), 1987 WL 880322, at *1516; cf. Brief for South Dakota, Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (No.
86-260), 1987 WL 880315 at *63-71. The Court expressly rejected South Dakota’s argument that the
Tenth Amendment places an independent constitutional bar on conditional spending. Dole, 483 U.S. at
210.
The Court also noted: “Our decisions have recognized that in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as
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to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’ ” Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Machine, 301
U.S. at 589-590). Upon this language, Petitioners
hang all their hopes. Yet Dole provided no elaboration
and did not find coercion on the facts of that case.
Although Dole and Steward Machine acknowledged
the theoretical possibility of a coercion claim, those
statements have never been uncoupled from the
Court’s skepticism that coercion “can ever be applied
with fitness to the relations between state and nation,” Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 590. As discussed
in the Statement and in Section II, infra, these
particular Medicaid amendments do not create
enough “pressure” to become “compulsion.” Dole, at
211 (quoting Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 589-590).
The second decision to explore conditional spending power and reject Tenth Amendment limitations
was New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992),
decided a few years after Dole. New York permitted
conditional spending to “influence a State’s legislative
choices.” Id. at 167, 188. Congress may “encourage a
state to conform to federal policy choices” by virtue of
conditional spending, and if a State’s residents do not
like the federal policy, they can instruct the State’s
legislators to reject the federal funding. Id. at 168.
The litigants again invited judicial enforcement
of Tenth Amendment limits on all congressional authority, but the Court declined the invitation and
reiterated that “the Federal Government [can] hold
out incentives to the States as a means of encouraging them to adopt suggested regulatory schemes.” Id.
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at 188; see also College Savings Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 687 (1999) (describing federal spending as a
“gift”). The Court has never recognized the Tenth
Amendment as a separate limit on the conditional
spending power, and the almost fully-funded Medicaid expansion at issue is not the occasion to do so.
Finally, the Court has consistently required that
States “clearly understand” the terms of the federal funding, protecting them from unknown terms. Arlington
Central School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S.
291, 296 (2006). In the present case, the Medicaid
expansions were debated for many months and
included a phase-in period of almost four years for
States to assess the terms of the funding, more than
sufficient for “clear notice.” Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 25 (1981).
B. The Reasoning of the Court of Appeals
Below Is Sound and Is Further Supported By Five Additional Arguments
These Medicaid amendments are not the compelling case for creating new precedent that the States
depict them to be, and not just for the reasons articulated by the court of appeals below. See Florida v.
HHS, 648 F.3d at 1267-1268. At least five additional
arguments support the Act’s constitutionality.
First, the federal government has for many
decades used Medicaid as a tool to further larger,
national health policy goals. Congress has mandated
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the fundamental elements of Medicaid – the baseline
requirements of who is eligible and what services
they must receive – while allowing options that
expand beyond the baselines. See Statement, supra.
Mandatory Medicaid eligibility has been expanded
several times, and although on each occasion States
could have withdrawn from the program, nevertheless, they remain. Arkansas Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 275 (2006) (“States
are not required to participate in Medicaid, but all
of them do.”).
Second, while the States claim the threatened
loss of all Medicaid funding, States’ Br. 10-11, 39-40,
this result is not automatic but rests in the reasonable discretion of the Secretary, who has never withdrawn all Medicaid funding for State noncompliance.
See Brief of Former HHS Officials as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr.
of S. California, Inc., Docket Nos. 09-958, 09-1158,
and 10-283, 7-8, 23-25 (2011). HHS policy is to work
with States to encourage compliance rather than to
penalize fragile Medicaid beneficiaries. See 42 C.F.R.
430.32 (States found to be out of compliance with
federal requirements will be asked to “correct” divergent practices); 42 C.F.R. 430.35 (State funding will
not be withheld until “a reasonable effort has been
made to resolve the issues through conferences and
discussions”). The Medicaid Act provides that “the
Secretary shall notify [the] State agency that further
payments will not be made to the State (or, in his
discretion, that payments will be limited to categories
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under or parts of the State plan not affected by such
failure), until the Secretary is satisfied that there will
no longer be any such failure to comply.” 42 U.S.C.
1396c (emphasis added); 42 C.F.R. 430.35 (indicating
that HHS will resume any funding that was halted
once compliance is demonstrated).
Petitioners’ fear of total funding loss, States’ Br.
35 n.15, 37, 39-40, is simply not cognizable, as the
Secretary has never exercised this power in fortyseven years of Medicaid administration. The Secretary has not threatened these States with the loss of
all funds after adoption of the ACA. See Gov’t Br. 4041. Coercion would surely require more than a theoretical fear of a never-expressed threat before the
claim is ripe for constitutional adjudication. See, e.g.,
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 508 (1961) (“The fact
that Connecticut has not chosen to press the enforcement of this statute deprives these controversies
of the immediacy which is an indispensable condition
of constitutional adjudication. This Court cannot be
umpire to debates concerning harmless, empty shadows.”).
Third, though Petitioners argue they are “locked”
into participating in Medicaid, States’ Br. 45 n.17,
and it may be true that most States could not afford
to run their own medical assistance programs absent
changes in their tax laws, many steps lie between
this argument and the conclusion that States are
coerced into participating in Medicaid. The federal
government does not coerce States simply because
they lack the political will to leave Medicaid or to
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provide funding for similar care. These arguments
speak to State behavior, not federal power. Medicaid
fills a need; one that the States ceded to the federal
government but could take back if desired. Courts
have long held that the temptation of funding does
not actually remove States’ “freedom of the will,”
Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 589-590, to make a
choice and live with the consequences.
Fourth, the essence of Petitioners’ argument is
that when States accept vast quantities of federal
funds, States should gain control over federal appropriations. In short, if States depend on Medicaid, it
must be coercive. If this paradox were true, then
States would have a perverse incentive to maximize
federal funding and their reliance upon it to such a
degree that the federal government would be forced to
cede control over its appropriations to the States.
While unconditional block grants to States might be a
political objective for some Petitioners, it is a late
moment in the history of the Republic to discover that
the Constitution requires it. This perverse view turns
a successful model of cooperative federalism on its
head and ignores the dual nature of Our Federalism,
wherein both States and the United States can exercise independent powers to tax and spend.
Fifth, federal spending legislation is the law of
the land by virtue of the Supremacy Clause. Telling
the federal government that it cannot set the terms of
its own duly enacted conditional spending statute
would be a dangerous step toward reversing the
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foundational, near-century-old understanding of the
power to spend as a distinct enumerated power.
II.

The Medicaid Amendments Are Not Coercive

Petitioners must demonstrate that whatever is
wrong with Medicaid is entirely new and novel.
Constitutional infirmity cannot be attached to tried
and true features of the existing program. The straw
that breaks the camel’s back must be constitutionally
distinguishable from all previous straws in Medicaid.
Petitioners fail in this task.
A. Petitioners Do Not Challenge the Constitutionality of the Existing Medicaid
Program
Petitioners do not claim that Medicaid itself is
unconstitutional as it stood immediately before the
Act. States’ Br. 5; Pet’rs’ Cert. Pet. 6-7. Precision is
important here. Petitioners attack Medicaid with
broad-brush strokes, conflating the cost of the existing Medicaid program with the new amendments. See
States’ Br. 39 (“The coerciveness of that demand is
self-evident, as the sheer size of the federal inducement at stake puts this spending legislation in a class
of one. Medicaid is already the single largest federal
grant-in-aid program, accounting for a staggering
40% of all federal funds distributed to States and
nearly 7% of total federal spending.”). They make no
claim that Congress’s previous Medicaid amendments
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are in any way constitutionally invalid. To make
sense of Petitioners’ coercion argument, the Court
must understand that their contention is limited to
very specific subsections of the new Medicaid amendments in a few portions of Title II of the Act that
allegedly threaten existing Medicaid funding. States’
Br. 40-41.
But the existing Medicaid program is not on trial
here. If anything, Petitioners profess their reliance on
existing Medicaid funding. States’ Br. 39-41. The cost
of the existing Medicaid program is relevant – if at all
– only if the federal government actually threatens to
cut off all funds in order to unconstitutionally coerce
the States, which it has never done since 1965 and
does not threaten to do here. See Section I.B., supra.
B. The Optional Medicaid Amendments Are
Not Coercive
Throughout the history of the Medicaid program,
some coverage expansions have been mandatory
while others are completely optional for States. See
Statement, supra (describing the history of the program). The Medicaid expansions under the Act are no
different. For example, ACA Section 2001(a)(4) gives
States the option to expand coverage before January
1, 2014, and ACA Section 2401 gives States the option to provide certain home and community-based
services. Petitioners do not challenge any optional
Medicaid amendments as coercive. See Gov’t Br. 53
n.24 (citing States’ Br. 47-48, 50).
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C. The Mandatory Medicaid Amendments
Are Not Coercive
1. The Allegedly Partisan Nature of
the Act Is Not Evidence of Coercion
One of Petitioners’ amici emphasizes the partisan
nature of the ACA enactment process. Br. of Center
for Constitutional Jurisprudence et al. in Support of
Pet’rs (Medicaid) 13-16. Although the constitutional
salience of this statement is unclear, we make a few
observations.
Petitioners claim to represent twenty-six States
at the present moment, States’ Br. ii, but when Congress voted for the ACA in March 2010, Senators or
Representatives from twenty-two of the twenty-six
Petitioner States voted for the Act. Kevin Outterson,
Obama Couldn’t Have Done It Without You, Red State
Edition, The Incidental Economist (February 14,
2012). From the Petitioners’ congressional delegations, a total of twenty-one United States Senators
and eighty-eight Members of the House of Representatives voted for the Act. Id. Quite simply, the Act
could not have passed without the support in 2010
from the Petitioners’ duly elected congressional delegations. As is often the case, the political landscape
changed after the mid-term elections in November
2010,3 but that change should alert this Court to the
3

After the 2010 mid-term elections and after Judge Vinson
had issued his substantive opinion on the motion to dismiss, 716
F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010), six states (Ohio, Kansas, Wyoming, Wisconsin, Maine, and Iowa) joined this suit as Petitioners
(Continued on following page)
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dangerous implications of a State’s subsequent political leadership claiming that the former leadership
had been coerced. Shifting political winds do not imply coercion.
In addition, at least one of the Petitioners is a
house divided. The Governor of Iowa is listed here as
a Petitioner; meanwhile, the Attorney General of
Iowa has joined two briefs in support of the Act. Br. of
California et al. in Support of Resp. (Severability); Br.
of Maryland et al. in Support of Pet’r (Minimum
Coverage Provision). We should not assume that the
Petitioners represent a monolithic consensus within
their States. Politics will run their course in due time
through the elected branches of our government.
2. The Mandatory Medicaid Amendments
Are Not a Novel Feature of the Act
For many decades Congress has modified the
Medicaid program through a combination of optional
and mandatory provisions. See Statement, supra. Indeed, most federal spending power legislation attaches
mandatory conditions to receipt of federal funds. See,
e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). Mandatory coverage categories are not a “transformation
of Medicaid,” States’ Br. 38, but have been a remarkably common feature of the program for decades. See
on January 18, 2011 through the filing of a Second Amended
Complaint in the district court, N.D. Fla. Dkt. 148, despite the
passing of the court’s deadline for new parties to be added.

27
Statement, supra (describing mandatory Medicaid
coverage categories over time). Given this historical
continuity, Petitioners have failed to demonstrate
why this particular set of Medicaid amendments
somehow crosses a constitutionally significant line.
3. The Federal Government Bears About
95% of the Cost of the Mandatory
Medicaid Amendments
The Medicaid amendments themselves are not
coercive because they will cost the States little or no
money. The mandatory expansions qualify for very
generous federal matching (FMAP) of 100% from
2014-2016, phasing down to 90% FMAP in 2020 and
thereafter. 42 U.S.C. 1396d(y). Official projections
claim the Act will save the States $33 billion. Memorandum from Richard S. Foster, Chief Actuary, CMS,
to the Obama Administration and Congress 12
(Apr. 22, 2010) (“The net impact of the Medicaid and
CHIP provisions on State Medicaid costs is a reduction totaling $33 billion through fiscal year 2019.”);
Matthew Buettgens et al., ACA and State Governments: Consider Savings as Well as Costs, Urban
Institute (July 2011). A state-by-state analysis by The
Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured
projected that over the coming decade, the federal
government will pay for 95% of the incremental costs
under the Medicaid amendments, leaving 5% of the
costs ($21.1 billion) to be paid by the States. John
Holahan & Irene Headen, Medicaid Coverage and
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Spending in Health Reform: National and State-byState Results for Adults at or Below 133% FPL at 2
(2010).
Other cost estimates are not germane because
they are not limited to the mandatory Medicaid
expansions at issue in this case. For example, some
cost estimates include the enrollment of previously
eligible individuals, which are not new mandatory
coverage expansions. See Cong. Research Service,
Variation in Analyses of PPACA’s Fiscal Impact on
States (Sept. 8, 2010). Petitioners make no claim that
Medicaid before the ACA was unconstitutional. Nor
have they articulated any theory explaining why it
is unconstitutional to encourage enrollment of people
already entitled to coverage under existing law. The
cost of any optional Medicaid provisions – about 60%
of Medicaid costs in 2007 – is also irrelevant to this
case and cannot be a basis for a coercion claim. See
Gov’t Br. 4, 29-30.
The fiscal impact of the mandatory coverage expansions on the States, when paired with an exceedingly generous 95% average federal match, is so
modest that the Petitioners “argument as to coercion
is shown to be more rhetoric than fact.” Dole, 483
U.S. at 211. Just as the withholding of 5% of federal
highway funds could not be coercive in Dole, the 5%
State contribution to mandatory Medicaid expansion
cannot be considered coercive here.
Petitioners quibble with this in only a halfhearted way. Their primary point of contention is not
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with the existing Medicaid program, or the various
optional and ancillary Medicaid amendments per se,
but with the very specific provisions that allegedly
threaten the loss of existing Medicaid funding. States’
Br. 8-9, 39-42. To these arguments we now turn.
D. Petitioners Fail to Identify Any Constitutionally Infirm Text in the Mandatory Medicaid Amendments
Petitioners stake their entire coercion case on a
single claim: that the federal government is making
an offer the States cannot refuse, holding the existing
Medicaid program hostage unless the States spend
$21.1 billion over a decade on the mandatory Medicaid expansions. States’ Br. 8-9, 39-42.
Petitioners are unaccountably vague as to the
exact textual source of their troubles. See States’ Br.
39 (“The ACA threatens States with loss of all of their
federal Medicaid funding if they do not capitulate to
Congress’ mandate that they dramatically expand
their obligations under the program.”). The Petitioners offer no citation for that dramatic statement.
Indeed, throughout that four-page section of their
brief, no citation is made to any provision in the ACA.
See States’ Br. 39-42. Petitioners have yet to identify
the precise language that is allegedly coercive and
compels that conclusion. Petitioners obliquely suggest
several candidates: (1) mandatory coverage expansion
for low-income children and adults; (2) the “essential
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health benefits” standard; (3) the “maintenance-ofeffort” rule; and (4) Section 2304. States’ Br. 7-13. As
we demonstrate in the sub-sections immediately
following, each proffered text is either indistinguishable from many prior Medicaid amendments, relies
on a distinction that entails no constitutional significance, or is simply misinterpreted.
1. Medicaid Expansion to Low-Income
Children and Adults Is Constitutional
Petitioners assert that the Act is unique in extending coverage to low-income children and adults,
beginning January 1, 2014. States’ Br. 6-7. This provision is found in ACA Section 2001(a)(1)(C), amending 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII). See Statement,
supra (discussing this coverage expansion and its
historical antecedents). Petitioners do not articulate
any plausible constitutional distinction between this
group of children and adults and existing Medicaid
beneficiaries to whom federal law already guarantees
coverage.
Medicaid presently mandates coverage for seven
categories of children and nonelderly adults. 42 U.S.C.
1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(I)-(VII); see Statement, supra. Petitioners articulate no reason why it is suddenly unconstitutional to adopt an eighth mandatory category of
low-income children and adults under the age of 65
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with incomes up to 133% FPL4 who are not pregnant
women, Medicare-eligible, or in another mandatory
category. The ACA’s new category becomes mandatory
in 2014. In the meantime, it is an optional category
that States may choose to cover. See Section II.E.,
infra (describing the efforts of early-adopter States).
Petitioners may have preferred that Congress
had given this population coverage through the ACA
health insurance exchanges with tax subsidies, see
States’ Br. 35-36, but this policy disagreement does
not rise to the level of a constitutional infirmity. Congress had rational reasons for choosing Medicaid: it
costs less per person than private insurance and has
a long and honorable track record of serving America’s poorest and most vulnerable. Whether the Petitioners agree with these reasons is the realm of
politics, not constitutional law.
2. The Essential Health Benefits Provision Is Constitutional
The second textual candidate – although not
clearly cited by Petitioners – is the requirement that
4

Petitioners are concerned about the size of this Medicaid
expansion, States’ Br. 7-8, but do not articulate any specific constitutional infirmity with 133% FPL as a boundary, which in
2012 is an annual income of $14,856.10 for an individual in the
continental United States, or $30,656.50 for a family of four.
2012 HHS Poverty Guidelines, http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/12
poverty.shtml. Why is 100% FPL constitutional, but 133% is
allegedly not?
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States provide the ACA’s new mandatory category
of low-income children and adults with Medicaid
benchmark coverage that includes the ACA’s “essential health benefits” (EHB). See ACA §2001(a)(2),
amending 42 U.S.C. 1396a(k)(1); ACA §2001(c),
amending 42 U.S.C. 1396u-7(b)(5); and the closely
related provisions describing “benchmark” coverage,
id. While the Petitioners label this issue “minimum
essential coverage,” States’ Br. 8, see ACA §1302, the
core definition for Medicaid purposes is EHB, from
which both benchmark plans and minimum essential
coverage are measured. ACA §2001(c)(3), amending
42 U.S.C. 1396u-7(b)(5). Petitioners’ confusion may
arise from the fact that ACA §2001(a)(2) provides for
the new EHB requirement and includes the phrase
“minimum essential coverage” in its caption. See ACA
§2001(a)(2).
Petitioners characterize the EHB changes as
novel and revolutionary. States’ Br. 8 (“that new and
onerous requirement . . . ”). As the history of Medicaid
aptly demonstrates, program design has never been
static, see Statement, supra, and mandatory coverage
standards for categorically needy individuals have
been a hallmark of the program since 1965. See 42
U.S.C. 1396a(a)(10)(A). Coverage changes are an annual feature of most commercial health plans and are
similarly unsurprising in Medicaid. This commonplace activity does not rise to the level of unconstitutional coercion.
While the federal government has historically
and constitutionally mandated minimum Medicaid
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coverage standards, the federal government has, in
the case of the EHB, indicated an intention to delegate to the States authority to define the details of
the EHB. Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight, Department of Health and Human Services, Essential Health Benefits Bulletin at 8
(Dec. 16, 2011). For example, the definition of benchmark plans in the HHS guidance allows States to
choose among several types of plans offered in the
large group or small group markets, thus allowing
the EHB package to vary from State to State, based
on local commercial market factors. Id.; see also
Institute of Medicine, Essential Health Benefits:
Balancing Coverage and Cost (Oct. 7, 2011). Many
other decisions are also being made at the State level,
such as the distinction between medical and nonmedical benefits, id. at 4-19 to 4-20, and the definition
of “medical necessity,” id. at 5-23 to 5-28. Therefore,
Petitioners’ claim that the Act “eliminates the flexibility States previously enjoyed,” States’ Br. 8, is
unfounded and overstated. Indeed, HHS policy on
implementing the ACA more broadly has reflected a
commitment to “maximum flexibility” to the States in
implementing the Act’s cooperative programs. See,
e.g., U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Establishment of Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans, 76
Fed. Reg. 41866, 41893 (July 15, 2011) (announcing
regulations affording State regulators “significant
flexibility” in applying standards for qualified health
plans under the new State Exchanges).
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Petitioners are reduced to arguing that conforming Medicaid to the same coverage standard required
for many commercial insurance plans under ACA
§1302 is unconstitutionally coercive, while not challenging Section 1302 itself. This is thin gruel for a
coercion claim, especially when States pay so little of
the incremental cost.
3. The Maintenance-of-Effort Provision
Is Not Coercive
Only one subsection in the Act appears to condition existing FMAP on immediate compliance with a
provision Petitioners find objectionable: the “maintenanceof-effort” (MOE) provision in ACA §2001(b)(2), amending 42 U.S.C. 1396a(gg); States’ Br. 6, 8-9, 45 n.17;
Gov’t Br. 30-31. As CMS explained to States, “[t]he
MOE provisions in the Affordable Care Act generally ensure that States’ coverage for adults under the Medicaid
program remains in place pending implementation of
coverage changes that become effective in January
2014.” CMS, Letter to State Medicaid Directors, Re:
Maintenance of Effort 1 (Feb. 25, 2011) (MOE Letter).
Claims of coercion or lack of clear notice are not
supportable given that HHS has used MOE provisions in many previous situations. Mark Greenberg,
HHS Policy Guidance On Maintenance of Effort, Assistance, and Penalties: Summary and Discussion, 4
Geo. J. on Fighting Poverty 315 (1997). Indeed, the
“Affordable Care Act MOE statutory provisions are
very similar to the MOE provisions in section
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5001(f)(1) of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act,” which were in place and to which States
were subject before the ACA was passed. See MOE
Letter, at 1.
In addition, the relevant MOE provision here is
temporary, expiring State by State as exchanges are
created, no later than Dec. 31, 2013.5 ACA §2001(b)(2),
codified at 42 U.S.C. 1396a(gg)(1)-(2). When States
have fully operational exchanges, the relevant part
of the MOE provision is effectively waived. ACA
§2001(b)(2).
Finally, the MOE provision cannot support a coercion argument because States may receive a waiver
of the requirement through a simple process. Petitioners complain that the mandatory expansions
will directly impact their budgets, States’ Br. 18, 39,
but ignore ACA §2001(b)(2), amending 42 U.S.C.
1396a(gg)(3), which excuses State noncompliance
with the MOE with respect to non-pregnant, nondisabled adults earning more than 133% FPL if “the
State certifies to the Secretary that, with respect to
the State fiscal year during which the certification is
made, the State has a budget deficit, or with respect

5

For children under 19, the MOE provision expires on October 1, 2019. Section 2001(b)(2), codified at 42 U.S.C. 1396a(gg)(2).
Petitioners do not specifically challenge the children’s eligibility
rules, focusing their complaint at the expansion for low-income
childless adults, States’ Br. 7-8, so the relevant expiration date is
no later than December 31, 2013.
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to the succeeding year, the State is projected to have
a budget deficit.” Id; MOE Letter, at Q.5.
At least one Petitioner has made this certification to the Secretary. On December 29, 2011, the
State of Wisconsin filed the required certification.
Letter from Mike Huebsch, Secretary, Wisconsin
Department of Administration (Dec. 29, 2011) (attachment). Under this certification and pending an
amendment to the State plan, Wisconsin will disenroll 53,161 Wisconsin residents from Medicaid.
Wisconsin Department of Health Services, 2011-2013
Medicaid Efficiencies, Maintenance of Effort (MOE)
Waiver Request of Eligibility Restrictions Established
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(PPACA) (undated, circa 2011). The certification
excuses Wisconsin from the MOE provision until
June 30, 2013, and thereafter if Wisconsin files again.
Id.
4. Section 2304 Is a Modest Clarification, Not a Sweeping Change
As the last arrow in their quiver, Petitioners
claim “the Act requires States not only to pay the
costs of care and services for Medicaid enrollees, but
also to assume responsibility for providing ‘the care
and services themselves.’ ” States’ Br. 9. This may
sound like a commandeering claim, but it is nothing
of the sort. Petitioners cite ACA Section 2304, concerning “the care and services themselves,” States’ Br.
9, but curiously ignore the use of the disjunctive “or”
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immediately before and “or both” immediately after
their quote. The full text of Section 2304 (found not
in the text, but only in their appendix, States’ Br.
45a) inserts “or the care and services themselves, or
both.” The omitted language is significant; in fact, the
omitted language entirely undermines Petitioners’
ensuing argument.
The purpose of this provision was merely to clarify the long-standing meaning of “medical assistance”
in Medicaid. See Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983, and Medicaid Entitlements, 42 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 413, 453-458
(2008). The House Report makes this abundantly
clear:
Section 1905(a) of the Social Security
Act defines the term “medical assistance.”
The term is expressly defined to refer to
payment but has generally been understood
to refer to both the funds provided to pay
for care and services and to the care and
services themselves. The Committee, which
has legislative jurisdiction over Title XIX
of the Social Security Act, has always understood the term to have this combined
meaning. Four decades of regulations and
guidance from the program’s administering
agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, have presumed such an understanding and the Congress has never
given contrary indications.
H.R. Rep. No. 111-299, 1st Sess., at 649-650, 2009 WL
3321420, at *693-695 (Leg. Hist.) (Oct. 14, 2009); see
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also 156 Cong. Rec. H1854, 1856, 2010 WL 1006359
(Mar. 21, 2010) (statement of Rep. Waxman) (explaining on the House floor the committee report’s rationale for the clarification); id. at H1891, 1967, 2010
WL 1027566 (Mar. 21, 2010); Jane Perkins & Gene
Coffey, Patient Protection Act Clarifies The Meaning
of “Medical Assistance,” National Health Law Program (March 31, 2010) (discussing the cases and
legislative history). This modest clarification does not
require any State to provide medical services directly.
E. The Medicaid Amendments Cannot Be
Considered Coercive to Early Adopter
States
ACA §2001(a)(4) allows “early adopter” States
to voluntarily expand coverage prior to January 1,
2014. Minnesota, Connecticut, and Washington D.C.
have taken advantage of this provision and other
States, such as Massachusetts and California, have
essentially become early adopters through Medicaid
waivers.
The example of early adopter States advances
two arguments. First, the fact that some States have
eagerly expanded optional coverage years ahead of
schedule undermines Petitioners’ claim of coercion.
Clearly, these States, and other States filing briefs
supporting the Act, embrace the Medicaid amendments.
Second, States accepting these benefits should be
protected from any ruling that would strike down
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relevant portions of the Medicaid amendments. The
Petitioners, if successful on this issue, seek the freedom to reject the federal offer, but this remedy should
not be imposed on other States that willingly accept
the Medicaid amendments. The more appropriate
remedy “would be to enjoin the ‘application’ of the
provision to unconsenting States and otherwise to
permit the eligibility extension to function as written.” Gov’t Br. 53 (citation omitted). Any State that
wants to continue to access federal funds under the
ACA should be allowed to do so, whether or not a
sister State alleges coercion. Federalism is not well
served by destroying the carefully crafted laws and
programs that many States have built in reasonable
reliance on the ACA, including the exchanges and
accepting the offer of early optional expansion. Br.
of California et al. in Support of Resp. (Severability),
13-27 (detailing the legislative efforts of California
and other States to implement the ACA).
Connecticut was the first state to take advantage
of the early adoption provision. Connecticut First in
Nation to Expand Medicaid Coverage to New Groups
Under the Affordable Care Act, U.S. Department of
Health & Human Services (June 21, 2010). Connecticut expected that 45,000 adults would become Medicaid-eligible under the new expansion. Id.
In May 2010, the District of Columbia followed
suit. Darryl Fears, D.C. Jumps At Health-Care Savings In Expanded Medicaid, Wash. Post, May 14,
2010, at B2. The approval of the request of the District of Columbia for the early enactment of the
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Medicaid expansion meant “switch[ing] 35,000 individuals from an insurance program funded by city
taxpayers to the Medicaid program.” Id.
In January 2011, Minnesota expanded the state’s
Medical Assistance Program, “provid[ing] MA benefits
for an estimated 51,000 adults currently enrolled in
MinnesotaCare and approximately 12,000 people not
enrolled in a state health care program.” Governor
Dayton Expedites Medicaid Expansion, Home Page of
the Office of the Governor (Jan. 20, 2011).
Under a Medicaid Section 1115 waiver, Massachusetts has already expanded subsidized insurance
coverage to the population between 100% and 133%
of the FPL. Br. of Health Care For All et al. (Minimum Coverage Provision) 7. Coverage has been extended to 411,722 Massachusetts residents under its
reforms. Id. at 9. Absent the additional federal funding through this waiver, Massachusetts could not
continue its Chapter 58 health care reform initiative.
Id. at 7. Massachusetts and CMS recently agreed on a
$26.75 billion extension of this waiver for the next
three years. Governor Patrick Announces $26.75 Billion Medicaid Waiver Agreement (Dec. 21, 2011).
California also was granted a Medicaid waiver
to allow the State to transition to Medicaid expansion
to take place in 2014 under the Act. California Department of Healthcare Services, California Bridge to
Reform: A Section 1115 Waiver Fact Sheet (Nov. 2010).
Though not utilizing provisions in the ACA itself, the
waiver expands coverage to those individuals who
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will be newly eligible under the Medicaid expansion
in 2014. Id. California has nearly seven million uninsured individuals and roughly a fifth of those
individuals are expected to be covered by 2016 under
the program. Kaiser Family Foundation, California’s
“Bridge To Reform” Medicaid Demonstration Waiver
(Oct. 2011 Update). As with Massachusetts, California is heavily relying on these Medicaid expansions to
ensure that it can afford to provide healthcare for its
residents. Br. for California et al. in Support of Resp.
(Severability) 28 (“Hundreds of thousands of individuals could thus face losing their health insurance.”).
The clearly expressed desire of these early
adopter States, which are eager to accept the federal
offer to help hundreds of thousands of State residents, demonstrates that Petitioners’ fear of coercion
is not universally felt amongst the States. In no event
should the reasonable expectations of these States,
including enhanced FMAP for mandatory and optional coverage expansions, be upset by the inchoate
fears of their sister States.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals upholding
the Medicaid eligibility expansion should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
MICHAEL KEVIN OUTTERSON (Counsel of Record)
BOSTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
LAURA HERMER, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS
NICOLE HUBERFELD, UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY
ELIZABETH WEEKS LEONARD, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA
SARA ROSENBAUM, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
SIDNEY D. WATSON, SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY
Counsel for Amici
February 17, 2012

